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Abstract
This paper addresses recent developments in monetary policy the-
ory in the context of a binding Zero Lower Bound and discusses the
possible evolution of monetary policy after the Great Recession. We
start from Olivier Blanchard’s suggestion that a higher inflation tar-
get and correspondingly higher interest rates would offer larger wiggle
room for Central Banks to stimulate the economy through monetary
easing without hitting the ZLB and might thus prove to be a desir-
able policy. Using a New-Keynesian DSGE framework and including
positive steady state inflation, we investigate if having a higher per-
manent inflation target would improve welfare and find that this is
unlikely. Furthermore, we address the possibility of having temporary
higher inflation targets and the effect this could have on economic
fundamentals. Finally, we discuss whether simple inflation targeting
suffices or if monetary policy might evolve in the aftermath of the cri-
sis towards including several objectives and/or instruments, so as to
better respond to future economic downturns.
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1 Introduction
The field of macroeconomics has faced a significant challenge brought
about by what is now known as the Great Recession or the Lesser Depres-
sion which started in 2008. By all accounts, it has failed both in predicting
this crisis and, more importantly, in offering a clear and unified recipe for
overcoming it. The reasons for this stark reality are rather complex and have
been detailed by several authors. 1 A general conclusion is that the profession
entered a so-called Dark Age, namely it chose to ignore very important devel-
opments and hard-won lessons that previous generations of macroeconomists
had contributed.
Origins of this contradictory reality can be traced back to the diverging
views on the science that emerged in the 1970’s when, dissatisfied with the
lack of rigor of Keynesian and Hicksian IS-LM models, economists started de-
veloping a different modeling approach based on micro-foundations, following
the Lucas critique. What the science undoubtedly gained in precision and
mathematical rigor, it lost in empirical applicability which was significantly
hindered by the unrealistic assumptions which were often the bedrock of the
new models. This combined with the fact that economists were no longer
well-versed in old-fashion Keynesian analysis which, for better or worse, was
empirically accurate and offered clear answers for economic policy in a down-
turn, generated the unsatisfactory reaction of the profession to the recent
developments.
In this context, one of the economic phenomena that had been overlooked
but suddenly came back to the forefront with increased relevance was the
Zero Lower Bound (henceforth ZLB), which occurs when central banks take
their benchmark interest rate as low as possible, in the immediate vicinity
of 0. This milestone is important as it signifies the end of the central bank’s
ability to stimulate the economy through conventional monetary policy -
very straightforwardly, cutting interest rates in a depression so as to increase
liquidity in the markets. If the economy is still depressed when interest rates
reach 0, unconventional monetary policy or fiscal policy are the only two
actions which can provide further stimulus.
The experience of Japan, which has been at the ZLB since the beginning
of 1995 - so for 17 years- without having the ability to overcome it, has been
publicized and studied rather extensively, mostly by Japanese economists.
Even so, most macroeconomists still believed in 2008 that the ZLB is a rather
exotic occurrence and more of a theoretical curiosity rather than a real threat
to any advanced economy. An often-mentioned argument was that, as per
1See for example Krugman (2009), Stiglitz (2010), Roubini and Mihm (2011)
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Fisher’s equation r = i − pie, one can lower real (r) rather than nominal (i)
interest rates under the 0 threshold by increasing expectations of inflation
(pie), which would be easy enough to do. However, it turned out that central
banks can’t generate inflation that easily if they are too credible.
While the US has been at the ZLB since 2008, the consequences for pol-
icymaking have been significant, because economists and economic decision-
makers failed to grasp in due time that the ZLB turns the rules of policy
upside down (e.g. deficit-financed stimulus spending does not increase inter-
est rates on sovereign debt in such circumstances). This has lead to a general
unwillingness to embark upon government programs that, while risky in nor-
mal times, would have proven the good antidote for the crisis. Adequate fiscal
stimulus to prop up the gap in demand or unconventional monetary policy
were very hard to come by and when countries finally decided to implement
them, it was only very reluctantly, when it became clear that conventional
alternatives had failed.
Taking all of this into account, some economists have argued that it could
be important in the future for central banks to have more wiggle room for
using conventional monetary policy, since alternative courses of action are not
politically palatable or have not yet generated consensus. After all, nominal
interest rates have hit the ZLB so quickly also because, for various reasons,
they were not very large in the beginning of the crisis. Thus, in a 2010
International Monetary Fund Staff Note, we find the following quote: ”The
crisis has shown that large adverse shocks can and do happen. . . . Should
policymakers therefore aim for a higher target inflation rate in normal times,
in order to increase the room for monetary policy to react to such shocks?
To be concrete, are the net costs of inflation much higher at, say, 4% than
at 2%, the current target range? Is it more difficult to anchor expectations
at 4% than at 2%?”. 2
This is the proposal that motivates this paper, as it has others before. In
the first part, we set out to investigate if a permanently higher inflation target
might indeed prove justified, taking into account the costs and benefits of such
a move. To do so, we make use of a New Keynesian DSGE framework, where
inflation plays a central part. Building counterfactuals for monetary policy
during the recent crisis, we show the extent to which the zero lower bound
was binding and assess the possibility of permanently higher steady-state
inflation. In the second part, we bring into focus the possibility of aiming for
temporary higher inflation, while also discussing post-crisis monetary policy.
2Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia, Mauro (2010)
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2 Literature Review: Inflation and the Zero
Lower Bound in New Keynesian Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium Models
New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) mod-
els are modern monetary models of the business cycle, developed after incor-
porating price stickiness into micro-founded Real Business Cycles models as
first developed by Kydland and Prescott (1982). They are now the standard
tool in macroeconomic analysis, as they provide an unmatched degree of rigor
and a solid framework for welfare analysis, policy evaluation and economic
forecasting.
Standard DSGE models are based on the seminal work by Clarida,
Gali, Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003), while Eggertson, Woodford (2003)
have provided a classical reference on how to model the ZLB into the DSGE
framework. They have shown that optimal monetary policy involves credible
commitment by central banks to a desirable course of action, namely basing
interest rate policy on a history-dependent price-level targeting rule which
would reduce the output loss from a temporary ZLB constraint.
Adam, Billi (2006) have determined optimal monetary policy under
commitment while taking into account the ZLB in computing the policy
regime. Using historical shock processes for the US economy, the authors find
that the ZLB doesn’t impose large constraints on optimal monetary policy.
They surmise that the ZLB binds infrequently and that positive inflation is
not optimal even in this event as there are no welfare losses associated with it.
This became the most encountered policy recommendation, as several papers
would find similar results even when using slightly differently articulated
DSGE frameworks. Furthermore, Adam, Billi (2006) find that, when faced
with adverse shocks, central banks must lower nominal interest rates more
aggressively due to the presence of the ZLB.
While previous studies had started with an arbitrarily imposed inflation
objective and then solved for its effects, Billi (2009) estimates a New Keyne-
sian model log-linearized around zero steady state inflation, with occasionally
binding ZLB on nominal interest rates, adding model uncertainty. Policy-
makers thus aim to maximize the economic welfare through their choice of
inflation rate. His results point to optimal inflation rates between 0.7% and
1.4% per year, depending on the degree of uncertainty allowed, which are
generally lower values than those advanced by previous research.
One very notable and recent contribution to the topic of optimality
of the inflation rate was put forward by Schmitt-Grohe´, Uribe (2010), who
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simulated a richly calibrated model under several assumptions in a model-
economy with numerous frictions. They conclude that the ZLB is not an
impediment for setting inflation targets near or below zero, the point being
that this constraint binds so rarely, that the optimal inflation target in these
situations is not very different than the optimal value in the unconstrained
model (-0,4% per year). This reinforces the result of Adam, Billi (2006). As
pointed out by McCallum (2011), the problem with this approach is that the
calibration used implies a zero probability of hitting the ZLB, so that the
optimal rate of inflation is unaffected. This is due to the fact that the lower
interbank rate is the most relevant for the ZLB problem, whereas Schmitt-
Grohe´, Uribe (2010) focus only on the risk-free rate.
The assumption that the non-negativity constraint binds infrequently
and that its effects dissipate quickly was a leap of faith. The current recession
proved that the ZLB can bind and that it can do so for many periods. Ireland
(2011) proves this point in a convincing fashion. Comparing the last three
recessions in the United States, he concludes that all of them were produced
by a combination of technology and preference shocks, which were usually
offset by accommodative conventional monetary policy. In 07-09 however,
these shocks were unusually persistent given the full extent of the crisis,
and thus pushed the nominal interest rates against the ZLB, causing a much
deeper output drop that had been necessary. Using estimated counterfactuals
for the path of interest rates and output, this paper submits that only a 1%
additional cushion in interest rates would have provided the needed monetary
stimulus for a solid recovery. A similar conclusion is reached by Williams
(2009) who uses counterfactuals for interest rate and unemployment to show
that theoretical additional cuts in interest rate after hitting the ZLB would
have ensured a much more rapid return to acceptable levels of unemployment
in the aftermath of the recession.
An important caveat to these models was that monetary policy was
considered independently, without consideration for the possible interplay
between fiscal and monetary policies when nominal interest rates are close
to zero. Werning (2011) addressed this issue and used a continuous-time
version of the standard New Keynesian DSGE model to draw policy rules in
such circumstances. Due to the forward-looking nature of inflation, he finds
that commitment to higher future inflation when at the ZLB is crucial and
that the policy of higher inflation as a precaution for future liquidity traps
may be far from optimal, especially if the ZLB binds for a small duration.
Thus, Werning (2011) provides a formal explanation for the proposition that
future monetary easing is beneficial at the ZLB, which was first offered by
Krugman (1998). Furthermore, the paper shows that the optimal mix of
fiscal and monetary policies must combine commitment to zero interest rates
5
for an extended period of time and modest transitory fiscal stimulus in the
beginning of the ZLB event. When there is a lack of commitment by the
central bank, Werning (2011) shows that fiscal intervention plays a much
more important part.
There was still an important limit to the use of New Keynesian DSGE
models for optimal monetary policy analysis, especially for the issue of in-
flation targeting at the ZLB. Blanchard’s proposition of higher inflation ev-
ery period as a hedge against the liquidity trap and its effects means pos-
itive steady-state inflation in the DSGE framework. However, almost all
the models previously used relied on log-linearization around a zero-inflation
steady-state. Motivated by this caveat, Coibion, Gorodnichenko, Wieland
(2012) solve a New Keynesian DSGE model with positive steady state in-
flation, deriving implications for welfare analysis. ”Using a welfare criterion
derived explicitly from the micro-foundations of the model”, they study the
optimal inflation rate comparing costs and benefits generated by targeting a
higher rate of inflation. As opposed to previous models, they assume that
higher trend inflation has not only costs (greater price dispersion, increased
price volatility, more forward-looking behavior) but also benefits (reduced
frequency and cost of hitting the ZLB). Even in this framework, the authors
conclude that the optimal inflation rate can’t surpass 2% and that higher
inflation targets are likely too blunt an instrument to address the costs of
the ZLB in an efficient way. Non-standard monetary policy is considered by
the authors to be the best way of addressing these costs.
DSGE models continue to be the best tool for evaluating monetary pol-
icy, but some qualifications can be added to this statement. It is known that
any DSGE model’s performance is only as good as the model’s assumptions,
so precautions must be taken when building such models to avoid assuming
away some characteristics of the true economy. As far as the ZLB is con-
cerned, it seems key to us that its existence and possible persistence have to
be modeled explicitly. Furthermore, model misspecification through omit-
ted variables may compromise the forecasts generated. In the context of the
present analysis, the models provide no role for the existence of credit fric-
tions, banks or debt, which is unlikely to be anodyne. Furthermore, such
models rely on the short-term interest rate set through a variation of the
Taylor rule as the only transmission channel for monetary policy. No role is
given to bank reserves or currency which are often used as alternative trans-
mission channels. Thus, an extended DSGE model including these features,
may prove to be even more reliable than the ones currently in use both for
business cycle analysis and forecast.
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3 The Models
In this section, we will detail two types of approaches to evaluating the
optimal inflation rate in New Keynesian DSGE models. Starting from a well-
known framework introduced by Clarida, Gali, Gertler (1999) and Woodford
(2003), the first uses a log-linearization around a steady state where inflation
is presumed to be zero in order to derive Ramsey-optimal monetary policy.
Then, following Ireland(2011) and Coibion, Gorodnichenko, Wieland (2012),
we introduce positive steady-state inflation to the model and discuss the
implications of this.
3.1 Ramsey-Optimal Monetary Policy at the Zero Lower
Bound in a New Keynesian DSGE Model
New Keynesian DSGE Models differ from their precursors, RBC Models,
by implicitly including price stickiness. But there are several ways in which
to formulate the idea that prices may be sticky. Taylor (1979) offered a
popular way to model this through staggered contracting. The assumption
is that firms set an optimal price contingent on knowing that the price will
then be fixed for a number of periods. Calvo (1983) supposed that, in every
period, not all firms change their prices, but only a fraction of them, while
the others keep them unchanged; the ones that do change must take into
account that the price may be fixed for several periods after that.
In this subsection, I use the method introduced by Rotemberg (1982),
the logic of which is that firms have to pay a certain quadratic adjustment
cost for changing their prices, which is the same for every firm ω. The cost
of inflation volatility is measured around a steady-state with zero inflation
and is given by:
Adjt(ω) =
κ
2
(
pt(ω)
pt−1(ω)
− 1
)2
Ct
where pt−1 is given by nature and κ is a positive parameter. The
production function of this firm will exhibit constant returns to scale, taking
the form:
yt = ZtLt
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Demand from consumers for the output of firm ω is:
yDt (ω) =
(
pt(ω)
Pt
)−θ
Ct
where θ is the elasticity of substitution. The advantage of using Rotem-
berg pricing is that the equilibrium will be symmetric, since all firms pay the
same cost. Thus relative prices will be unity so firms will produce the same
output with the same amount of labor. Profit for a generic firm can then be
written:
Ψt = (1 + τ)y
D
t − wtLt −
κ
2
(
pt
pt−1
− 1
)2
Ct
The firm will maximize this profit at time t, choosing Lt (labor remuner-
ated at wt) and pt (price), subject to yt = y
D
t . τ is a sales subsidy which can
be used to correct any steady-state distortions. Solving this problem by tak-
ing into account the symmetry of the equilibrium and denoting 1+pit =
Pt
Pt−1
,
we obtain the first order conditions:
Lt : λt =
wt
Zt
pt : (1 + τ)(1− θ) + θλt − κpit(1 + pit) + βκEt[pit+1(1 + pit+1)] = 0
Zt is production per unit of labor (the technology), so λt, the Lagrange
multiplier on the constraint, is the marginal cost while β is the coefficient of
inter-temporal preference. From the labor supply decision of households we
know that:
wt = CtvL(Lt)
We can derive this model’s New Keynesian Phillips curve, after log-
linearizing around a steady state with zero inflation:
pit = βEtpit+1 − θ − 1
κ
µt
Where µt = −λt is the mark-up. Consequently we can write the Ramsey
problem which is solved to get the optimal inflation rate, assuming a sepa-
rable and logarithmic in consumption form for the utility function. v(L) is
isoelastic, namely: vLL(L)L
vL(L)
= ϕ:
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max
Ct,Lt,pit
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt[lnCt − v(Lt)] (1.1)
s.t.
Ct
(
1 +
κ
2
pi2t
)
= ZtLt (1.2)
(1 + τ)(1− θ) + θCtvL(Lt)
Zt
− κpit(1 + pit) + βκEt[pit+1(1 + pit+1)] = 0 (1.3)
1 = βEt
[
(1 + It)Ct
(1 + pit+1)Ct+1
]
(1.4)
It > 0 (1.5)
where (1.2) is the resource constraint which states that output will be
used for consumption and for paying the quadratic adjustment cost, (1.3) is
the first-order condition previously derived, (1.4) is the Euler equation, and
(1.5) is the non-negativity constraint on the nominal interest rate It, which
is now included into the model and treated explicitly. The Lagrangian is:
max
Ct,Lt,pit
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt{lnCt − v(Lt)+
+ η1,t
[
ZtLt − Ct
(
1 +
κ
2
pi2t
)]
+
+ η2,t
[
(1 + τ)(1− θ) + θCtvL(Lt)
Zt
− κpit(1 + pit) + βκEt[pit+1(1 + pit+1)]
]
+
+ η3,t
[
1− βEt
(
1 + It
1 + pit+1
Ct
Ct+1
)]
+
+ η4,tIt}
(1.6)
Where η1,t, η2,t, η3,t, η4,t are the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the
four constraints. In standard DSGE models, the non-negativity constraint
is ignored, thus assuming negative interest rates are possible. Solving a
model which includes at least one non-negativity constraint, here the ZLB,
requires the use of a different technique than usual, namely the Kuhn-Tucker
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formulation, explained in Simon, Blume (1994). The optimality conditions
are now:
Ct :
1
Ct
− η1,t
(
1 +
κ
2
pi2t
)
+ η2,tθ
vL(Lt)
Zt
−
− η3,tβ 1 + It
1 + pit + 1
1
Ct+1
+ η3,t−1
1 + It−1
1 + pit
Ct−1
C2t
= 0
(1.7)
Lt : −vL(Lt) + η1,tZt + η2,tθCtvLL(Lt)
Zt
= 0 (1.8)
pit :− κη1,tCtpit − κη2,t(1 + 2pit) + κη2,t−1(1 + 2pit)+
+ η3,t−1
1 + It−1
(1 + pit)2
Ct−1
Ct
= 0
(1.9)
It : −η3,tβ 1
1 + pit+1
Ct
Ct+1
+ η4,t = 0 (1.10)
η4,tIt = 0 (1.11)
η4,t > 0 (1.12)
It > 0 (1.13)
Where (1.11)-(1.13) are the conditions for the non-negativity constraint
on interest rates. When the ZLB is not binding and It > 0, the Lagrange
multiplier η4,t becomes zero by the Kuhn-Tucker condition in equation (1.11)
and interest rates will be determined by the rest of the equations. When the
ZLB is binding and It = 0, the interest rate is set to zero and it remains
at this level until η4,t becomes zero. The system can be transformed with
steady state values, taking the normalization Zt = 1:
(1 + τ)(1− θ) + θCvL(L) + (β − 1)κpi(1 + pi) = 0 (1.14)
L = C
(
1 +
κ
2
pi2
)
(1.15)
pi = β − 1 (1.16)
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1C
− η1
(
1 +
κ
2
pi2
)
+ η2θvL(L) + η3(1− β) 1
1 + pi
1
C
= 0 (1.17)
− vL(L) + η1 + η2θCvLL(L) = 0 (1.18)
η1κCpi + η3
1
(1 + pi)2
= 0 (1.19)
− η3 1
(1 + I)2
+ η4 = 0 (1.20)
Iη4 = 0 (1.21)
η4 > 0 , I > 0 (1.22)
For equation (1.20) to hold, taking into account (1.21), we thus have
two possible cases:
Case 1: η4 = 0, I > 0, the ZLB doesn’t bind. From equation (1.20) we
get that η3 = 0 and from equation (1.19) we will obtain that the only feasible
solution is pi = 0, as η1 = 0 gives an impossible solution. This corresponds to
the result from the basic DSGE model with no ZLB where optimal inflation
is 0, since there are no benefits associated with non-negative inflation.
Case 2: η4 > 0, I = 0, the ZLB binds. The system becomes, after
substituting pi = β − 1:
(1 + τ)(1− θ) + θCvL(L) + (β − 1)2κβ = 0
L = C
[
1 +
κ
2
(β − 1)2
]
1− η1C
[
1 +
κ
2
(β − 1)2
]
+ η2θCvL(L) + η3(1− β) 1
β
= 0
− vL(L) + η1 + η2θCvLL(L) = 0
η3 = η4 = β
2κη1C(1− β)
pi = β − 1
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I = 0, η4 > 0
Since the equilibrium condition at the steady state here is η3 = η4 =
β2κη1C(1− β), we can conclude that the only way for this to hold is β > 1.
This is because η1, being the Lagrange multiplier on the resource constraint,
is negative, the intuition being that the shadow value of relaxing the resource
constraint is positive. Our model thus provides no clear solution, because β
can’t exceed one, so the binding ZLB can’t be an equilibrium of the Ramsey
problem, but it does provide the key intuition: a shock to the discount factor
can make the ZLB bind.
Consequently, this simple DSGE framework without trend inflation is
ill-suited to provide an answer to the question of optimal inflation at the ZLB,
as it provides only two answers: zero or indeterminacy. It will prove much
more relevant in the next sections to include positive steady-state inflation,
log-linearize around it and solve the dynamic problem.
3.2 Inflation and Welfare in a New Keynesian DSGE
Model
Since we are concerned with the question of inflation rate optimality in
a context of binding ZLB, we must mention here the approach and results
of Billi (2009), who estimated a New Keynesian DSGE with Calvo (1983)
pricing to derive this measure. The model focuses on the policymaker’s
welfare maximization problem:
max
pit,xt,it
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt[(pit − γpit−1)2 + λx2t ] (2.1)
s.t.
pit − γpit−1 = βEt(pit+1 − γpit) + κxt + ut (2.2)
xt = Etxt+1 − ϕ(it − Etpit+1 − rt) (2.3)
ut = ρuut−1 + σuεut (2.4)
rt = (1− ρr)r¯ + ρrrt−1 + σrεrt (2.5)
it > 0 (2.6)
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Here, (2.1) expresses the policymaker’s objective, which has a quadratic
form both in output gap, xt and the unanticipated component of price
changes, given by pit − γpit−1, where γ is the degree of indexation of prices
that are not Calvo-optimized. β is, as before, the subjective discount factor
and λ is the weight assigned to the output stability objective. (2.2) describes
the optimal behavior of firms under price-setting, with κ the slope parameter
and ut a mark-up shock. (2.3) is the inter-temporal Euler equation, where
ϕ is the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution and rt the real rate of inter-
est shock. (2.4) gives the law of motion for the exogenous mark-up shock,
which is AR(1) with autoregressive coefficient ρu and innovation σuεut which
is iid, with mean zero and positive standard deviation σu. (2.5) gives the law
of motion for the real-rate shock, which is also AR(1) with autoregressive
coefficient ρr and innovation σrεrt which is iid, with mean zero and posi-
tive standard deviation σr. Just as in the model we solved previously, (2.6)
represents the ZLB on nominal interest rates.
The model is solved with Kuhn-Tucker conditions, calibrated and esti-
mated. The problem is written:
max
pit,xt,it
min
η1,t,η2,t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt{−(pit − γpit−1)2 − λx2t+
+ η1,t[(1 + βγ)pit − γpit−1 − κxt − ut]−
− η1,t−1pit+
+ η2,t[−xt − ϕ(it − rnt )]+
+ η2,t−1β−1(xt + ϕpit)}
s.t.
ut = ρuut−1 + σuεut
rt = (1− ρr)r¯ + ρrrt−1 + σrεrt
it > 0
where η1,t, η2,t are the Lagrange multipliers associated to constraints
(2.2) and (2.3). The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
pit − γpit−1 = βEt(pit+1 − γpit) + κxt + ut
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xt = Etxt+1 − ϕ(it − Etpit+1 − rt)
pit : −2(pit − γpit−1) + (1 + βγ)η1,t − η1,t−1 + β−1ϕη2,t−1 = 0
xt : −2λxt − κη1,t − η2,t + β−1η2,t−1 = 0
it : −ϕη2,tit = 0, η2,t > 0, it > 0
The last equation imposes similar conditions as in the previous section:
either the Lagrange multiplier on the Euler equation is zero or nominal in-
terest rates are zero, and the ZLB binds.
After solving the nonlinear system, calibrating and estimating the model,
its predictions for optimal inflation range from 0.2 % to 0.7 %, depending
directly on the amplitude of the two shocks. With model uncertainty added
to this framework via ’worst case shocks’ in the planner’s objective function
and with the biggest amplitude of monetary and mark-up shocks, optimal
inflation is found to be 1.4 %. The mechanism at work here is the trade-off
between the insurance against hitting the ZLB provided by higher inflation
and the cost of this inflation to the economy. When uncertainty is high, it
would be optimal to raise inflation and interest rates as much as possible, but
since this is costly, it is not optimal to reach a value that would fully insure
against the ZLB (which would be 4% according to the FRB/US forecasting
model).
3.3 New Keynesian DSGE Models with Trend Infla-
tion
We use here a small-scale NK DSGE model to evaluate the costs of the
ZLB in terms of output lost and to discuss the implications of directly mod-
eling positive steady-state inflation for the welfare analysis. We extend the
demonstrative model used in the previous section to include, along a repre-
sentative household, a representative finished goods producing firm, a contin-
uum of intermediate-goods producing firms and a monetary authority. As we
will explain, the NK framework makes use of habit formation in the house-
hold’s preferences and a Rotemberg pricing formula as before, enhanced this
time with partial indexation.
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The household’s utility function takes the form
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtat[ln(Ct − γCt−1) + ln(Mt
Pt
)− Lt] (3.1)
and its budget constraint is
Mt−1 +WtLt +Bt−1 + Tt +Dt
Pt
> Ct +
Mt
Pt
+
Bt
rtPt
(3.2)
where β is the discount factor, γ is the habit formation parameter,
at is a preference shock, Ct represents the units of good consumed, Pt the
nominal price of this good purchased from the finished-good consuming firm,
Mt the money holdings, Lt the units of labor which is rewarded with the
wage Wt, Bt the bonds owned by the household, Dt the payments from the
dividend on these bonds, Tt a lump-sum money transfer to the household,
and, finally, rt is the nominal interest rate. The model is a rather standard
one, the two more particular features that may be pointed out are the habit
formation which points to backward-looking behavior in consumption and
the preference shock which is assumed to follow an AR(1) process of the
following form, where εat is serially uncorrelated, normally distributed with
mean zero and standard deviation σa:
ln(at) = ρa ln(at−1) + εat
The household maximizes its utility choosing Ct, Lt, Mt and Bt in every
period, and this yields the following first order conditions:
at
Ct − γCt− 1 − βγEt
(
at+1
Ct+1 − γCt
)
= ζt (3.3)
at = ζt
Wt
Pt
(3.4)
βrtEt
ζt+1Pt
Pt+1
= ζt (3.5)
Mt
Pt
=
at
ζt
rt
(rt − 1) (3.6)
where ζt > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint.
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The representative finished goods-producing firm uses a quantity
Yt(i) of each intermediate goods, which is purchased at price Pt(i) to manu-
facture Yt units of the finished good according to the technology:[∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
θt−1
θt di
] θt
θt−1
> Yt (3.7)
where θt is a cost-push shock on the firm’s desired mark-up which follows
an AR(1) process in which the serially uncorrelated innovation εθt is normally
distributed with mean zero and standard deviation σθ:
ln(θt) = (1− ρθ) ln(θ) + ρθ ln(θt−1) + εθt
Thus, in each period the finished goods-producing firm chooses the quan-
tity of intermediate goods it purchases so that it maximizes profits:
max
Yt(i)
Pt
[∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
θt−1
θt di
] θt
θt−1 −
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)Yt(i)di
The first order conditions for this problem yield:
Yt(i) =
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θt
Yt (3.8)
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
1−θtdi
] 1
1−θt
(3.9)
The representative intermediate goods-producing firm manufac-
tures the Yt(i) units of intermediate goods using the labor of the household,
which we called Lt according to a technology:
ZtLt(i) > Yt(i) (3.10)
where the aggregate technology shock is characterized by a random walk
with drift and serially uncorrelated innovation with mean zero and standard
deviation σz :
ln(Zt) = ln(z) + ln(Zt−1) + εzt
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In a monopolistically competitive market, the intermediate goods-producing
firm chooses its nominal price so that it can meet the demand of the finished
goods-producing firm at that price. Like in the previous model, the firm
faces a quadratic cost of adjusting its nominal price, as in Rotemberg (1982).
The cost is thus given by:
κ
2
(
Pt(i)
piαt−1pi1−αPt−1(i)
− 1
)2
Yt
where κ is the magnitude of the price adjustment cost, α gives the nature
of price-setting (forward or backward-looking) and, importantly, pi is the level
of steady-state inflation, which didn’t appear before.
In each period, the intermediate goods-producing firm chooses Pt(i) to
maximize its market value:
max
Pt(i)
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtζtΨt (3.11)
where the value of profits is:
Ψt =
Dt(i)
Pt
=
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]1−θt
Yt−
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θt (WtYt
PtZt
)
−κ
2
(
Pt(i)
piαt−1pi1−αPt−1(i)
− 1
)2
Yt
and βtζt gives the marginal utility for the household of an additional unit
in income from dividends. The first order conditions for this problem are:
0 = (1− θt)
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θt
+ θt
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−1−θt ( Wt
PtZt
)
−
− κ
[
Pt(i)
piαt−1pi1−αPt−1(i)
− 1
] [
Pt(i)
piαt−1pi1−αPt−1(i)
]
+
+ βκEt
{(
ζt+1
ζt
)[
Pt+1(i)
piαt pi
1−αPt(i)
− 1
] [
Pt+1(i)
piαt pi
1−αPt(i)
] [
PtYt+1
Pt(i)Yt
]}
(3.12)
ZtLt(i) = Yt(i) (3.13)
The monetary authority - central bank conducts monetary policy
according to a Taylor (1993) rule which responds to fluctuations in inflation,
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output gap and output growth rate, comparing to their steady state levels pi,
x and g, according to the coefficients ρpi, ρx and ρg. The central bank chooses
this steady-state value of inflation, which is its long-run inflation target. The
Taylor rule is:
ln
(rt
r
)
= ρr ln
(rt−1
r
)
+ ρpi ln
(pit
pi
)
+ ρx ln
(xt
x
)
+ ρg ln
(
gt
g
)
+ εrt (3.14)
There is also interest rate smoothing, the central bank taking into account
the previous levels of the interest rate when setting the current one. As in
the case of all the previous shocks, the monetary policy shock εrt is normally
distributed with mean zero and standard deviation σr.
Having defined the model, we now proceed to re-writing the system in
symmetric equilibrium, where intermediate goods-producing firms make the
same decisions and the market clearing conditions for money and bonds hold.
In particular, this means that Lt(i) = Lt, Yt(i) = Yt, Pt(i) = Pt, Mt =
Mt−1 + Tt and Bt = Bt−1 = 0. The system becomes:
Yt = Ct +
κ
2
(
pit
piαt−1pi1−α
− 1
)2
Yt (3.15)
ζt =
at
Ct − γCt− 1 − βγEt
(
at+1
Ct+1 − γCt
)
(3.16)
ζt = βrtEt
(
ζt+1
pit+1
)
(3.17)
θt − 1 = θt
(
at
ζtZt
)
− κ
(
pit
piαt−1pi1−α
− 1
)(
pit
piαt−1pi1−α
)
+
+ βκEt
[(
ζt+1Yt+1
ζtYt
)(
pit+1
piαt pi
1−α − 1
)(
pit+1
piαt pi
1−α
)]
(3.18)
ln
(rt
r
)
= ρr ln
(rt−1
r
)
+ ρpi ln
(pit
pi
)
+ ρx ln
(xt
x
)
+ ρg ln
(
gt
g
)
+ εrt (3.19)
1
Zt
=
1
Qt − γQt−1 − βγEt
[(
at+1
at
)(
1
Qt+1 − γQt
)]
(3.20)
ln(at) = ρa ln(at−1) + εat (3.21)
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ln(θt) = (1− ρθ) ln(θ) + ρθ ln(θt−1) + εθt (3.22)
ln(Zt) = ln(z) + ln(Zt−1) + εzt (3.23)
xt =
Yt
Qt
(3.24)
gt =
Yt
Yt−1
(3.25)
where (3.20) is en equation that needs to hold for the efficient level of
output Qt, (3.21)-(3.23) are the processes followed by the three shocks except
monetary policy, (3.24) gives the level of the output gap in relation to its
efficient level and (3.25) gives the growth rate of output. In this system with
eleven variables and equations, some will have unit roots from the random-
walk technology shock (3.23). We need to express equilibrium conditions
in terms of stationary variables, so we proceed to detrending the variables:
yt = Yt/Zt, ct = Ct/Zt, qt = Qt/Zt, λt = Ztζt and zt = Zt/Zt−1. The system,
now stationary, is written:
yt = ct +
κ
2
(
pit
piαt−1pi1−α
− 1
)2
yt
ln(at) = ρa ln(at−1) + εat
λt =
atzt
ztct − γct−1 − βγEt
(
at+1
zt+1ct+1 − γct
)
λt = βrtEt(λt+1/zt+1pit+1)
ln(θt) = (1− ρθ) ln(θ) + ρθ ln(θt−1) + εθt
ln(Zt) = ln(z) + ln(Zt−1) + εzt
θt − 1 = θtat
λt
− κ
(
pit
piαt−1pi1−α
− 1
)(
pit
piαt−1pi1−α
)
+
+ βκEt
[(
λt+1yt+1
λtyt
)(
pit+1
piαt pi
1−α − 1
)(
pit+1
piαt pi
1−α
)]
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ln(rt/r) = ρr ln(rt−1/r) + ρpi ln(pit/pi) + ρx ln(xt/x) + ρg ln(gt/g) + εrt
gt = (yt/yt−1)zt
1 =
zt
ztqt − γqt−1 − βγEt
[(
at+1
at
)(
1
zt+1qt+1 − γqt
)]
xt = yt/qt
In order to use the model for analyzing the response of the economy to one
of the shocks, we will log-linearize around a steady state in which inflation
is not zero and is exogenously determined. After applying first-order Taylor
approximations, we get the final system:
λˆt = rˆt + Etλˆt+1 − Etpˆit+1 (3.26)
(1 + βα)pˆit = αpˆit−1 + βEtpˆit+1 − ψλˆt + ψaˆt + eˆt (3.27)
rˆt = ρrrˆt−1 + ρpipˆit + ρxxˆt + ρggˆt + εrt (3.28)
(z − βγ)(z − γ)λˆt =γzyˆt−1 − (z2 + βγ2)yˆt + βγzEtyˆt+1
+ (z − βγρa)(z − γ)aˆt − γzzˆt (3.29)
aˆt = ρaaˆt−1 + εat (3.30)
eˆt = ρeeˆt−1 + εet (3.31)
zˆt = εzt (3.32)
gˆt = yˆt − yˆt−1 + zˆt (3.33)
0 = γzqˆt−1 − (z2 + βγ2)qˆt + βγzEtqˆt+1 + βγ(z − γ)(1− ρa)aˆt − γzzˆt (3.34)
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xˆt = yˆt − qˆt (3.35)
A series of transformations have been applied here. Since cˆt = yˆt, cˆt
has been dropped from the system. The cost-push shock θt is normalized as
eˆt = −θt 1κ while ρθ = ρe. Finally, for convenience, ψ = θ−1γ .
In this system, (3.26) is the New Keynesian IS curve, which links past,
present and expected future output to the real interest rate, (3.27) is the New
Keynesian Phillips curve with backward and forward-looking components
given by α and (3.28) is the Taylor rule.
As for the rest of the equations: (3.29) gives the marginal utility of
consumption in terms of past, present and expected output, (3.30)-(3.32) are
the laws of motion for preference, cost-push and technology shocks, (3.33)
gives the growth rate of output, (3.34) the efficient level of output and (3.35)
the output gap.
The model used here follows Canova (2009), focusing on the three equa-
tions (3.26)-(3.28) explained before, describing the optimizing behavior of
representative households (NK IS curve), the optimizing behavior of mo-
nopolistic firms (NK Phillips curve) and how the monetary authority sets
short-term interest rates in response to relevant variables and their deviation
from the steady state. While the characteristics of the model are relatively
standard, here they match the framework used by Ireland(2011).
Blanchard and Kahn (1980) introduced a method for solving such sys-
tems of equations. This consists of re-writing the system in the form of a
state-space econometric model:
A
[
xt+1
Etyt+1
]
= B
[
xt
yt
]
+ Cεt
where xt is an (n× 1) vector of state (predetermined) variables, yt is an
(m× 1) vector of control (or jump) (non-predetermined) variables, and εt is
an (k×1) vector of stochastic shocks at time t. A and B are (n+m)×(n+m)
matrices; C is an ((n + m) × k) matrix. The difference between state and
control variables is that the values of the state variables at time t+ 1 do not
depend on the t+ 1 shocks; while the values of the control variables depend
on them. We re-write our system of equations as:
AEts
0
t+1 = Bs
0
t + Cξt
and we will have four state variables, six control variables and 4 shocks,
such that:
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s0t =
[
yˆt−1 pˆit−1 rˆt−1 qˆt−1 xˆt gˆt λˆt yˆt pˆit qˆt
]′
s0t+1 =
[
yˆt pˆit rˆt qˆt xˆt+1 gˆt+1 λˆt+1 yˆt+1 pˆit+1 qˆt+1
]′
ξt =
[
aˆt eˆt zˆt εrt
]′
The procedure used to derive the solution of this model is further de-
tailed in the Annex A of the paper. The solution links the behavior of the
observable variables - output growth rate, inflation rate and short-term nom-
inal interest rate - to a vector of unobserved state variables, four of which
are the exogenous shocks. We can use Kalman filtering and smoothing af-
ter having written the solution as a state-space econometric model and this
will allow us to obtain maximum likelihood estimates of the model’s struc-
tural parameters. The computational steps that lead to this are presented
in more detail in Annex B. Using the estimates, we are then able to run
a policy counterfactual which compares the actual paths for the three ob-
servable variables with the counterfactual path of the same variables given
by the smoothed estimates. If we run this counterfactual without imposing
any restriction on the model, this would only serve to compare the model
predictions with reality, and we would actually see that the fit between the
two is almost perfect. But our goal here is to see how the ZLB impacts the
economy, so we will compare the actual path for the three state variables
to the counterfactual path obtained when three out of the four shocks are
allowed to impact; more precisely, we will zero out the monetary policy shock.
The simulation is run on US quarterly data, running from 1983:Q1
to 2012:Q1, taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ FRED 2
Database. The state variables are defined as follows:
• Outupt growth: seasonally-adjusted, quarter-to-quarter changes in nat-
ural logarithm of real GDP in chained 2005 dollars (GDPC96), di-
vided by the civilian non institutional population ages 16 and over
(CNP16OV) to get per-capita measures.
• Inflation rate: seasonally-adjusted, quarter-to-quarter changes in nat-
ural logarithm of the GDP deflator (GDPDEF)
• Short-term nominal interest rate: quarterly averages on the three-
month US Treasury bill daily rate (TB3MS), coverted to quarterly yield
to maturity
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The results of these simulations are presented in the form of three
graphs on the next page, which plot actual and counterfactual data for the
time interval 2007:Q1-2012:Q1. In the biggest graph we can see that had
the ZLB not started to bind in 2009, the US Federal Reserve would have
further decreased the short-term nominal interest rate by 100 basis points
(that is, by 1%), according to the Taylor rule in our model. This would have
allowed a more rapid recovery for output, as shown in the smaller graph on
the lower-left side. Furthermore, we notice that the ZLB still binds, as the
counterfactual of interest rate is still under the actual value in 2012:Q1. In-
flation, in the lower-right side, would have had slightly higher levels, but by
the end of the dataset, it would have been close to its actual value. Conse-
quently, estimating a model such as the one presented in this section seems
to provide some support to the view that inflation targets can be augmented
by 1% to prevent hitting the ZLB and thus achieving a sub-optimal recovery
path. It remains to be seen if welfare analysis also lends supports this view.
23
Results of Counterfactual Simulations for the State Variables
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3.4 Inflation and Welfare in a New Keynesian DSGE
Model with Trend Inflation
While the results of these simulations and counterfactuals illustrate the
extent to which conventional monetary policy was and still is constrained
by the ZLB, they don’t address the issue of optimality of the inflation rate.
Welfare considerations however are key to understanding if a permanently
higher inflation target is mandated as an insurance policy against the non-
negativity constraint on nominal interest rates. It is possible to use the NK
DSGE framework with log-linearization around a steady state which need not
be zero to estimate optimal inflation. Indeed, this is the focus of very recent
research in the field of monetary policy. Coibion, Gorodnichenko, Wieland
(2012) build a model which is almost identical to the one used in the previous
section of this paper, while also attaching a welfare function to it. We briefly
present this model in what follows.
The utility-maximization function for the representative household takes
the form:
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
ln(Ct − γgAt Ct−1)−
η
η + 1
∫ 1
0
Nt(i)
1+ 1
η di
]
(4.1)
and the budget constraint is:∫ 1
0
Nt(i)Wt(i)
Pt
di+
Bt−1qt−1Rt−1
Pt
+ Tt > Ct +
Bt
Pt
(4.2)
If we compare these two equations with equations (3.1) and (3.2) in the
previous section, we can see they have similar configurations and variables: β
is the discount factor, γ is the habit formation parameter, Ct represents the
units of final good consumed, Pt the nominal price of this good purchased
from the finished-good consuming firm, Nt the units of labor supplied to
industry i, which gets rewarded with the wage Wt, Bt the bonds owned by
the household, Tt a lump-sum money transfer to the household, and, finally,
Rt is the nominal interest rate. What is new here is g
A
t which is the growth
rate of technology, η which is the Frisch labor supply elasticity, qt is a risk-
premium shock and ξt will be the shadow value of wealth.
The first-order conditions of this maximization problem are:
1
(Ct − γgAt Ct−1)
− βγEtg
A
t+1
(Ct+1 − γgAt+1Ct)
= ξt (4.3)
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Nt(i)
1
η =
ξtWt(i)
Pt
(4.4)
ξt
Pt
= βEt
[
ξt+1qtRt
Pt+1
]
(4.5)
These are equivalent to equations (3.3) - (3.5). Similarities continue, as
the production of the final good is done by a perfectly competitive sector
which aggregates a continuum of intermediate goods as per:[∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
θt−1
θt di
] θt
θt−1
> Yt (4.6)
where θt is the elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods and Yt
the final good resulting fro the aggregation. This corresponds perfectly to
equation (3.7). The first order conditions for this problem will again give the
demand curve for goods of the intermediate sector i and the aggregate price
level, as in equations (3.8) and (3.9):
Yt(i) =
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θt
Yt (4.7)
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
1−θtdi
] 1
1−θt
(4.8)
A monopolist manufactures the Yt(i) units of intermediate goods using the
labor of the household, which we called Nt and technology Zt as in equation
(3.10):
ZtNt(i) > Yt(i) (4.9)
There is, however, another difference between these two models, as
price stickiness is here modeled as in Calvo (1983), with λ the probability
that firms will not be able to reoptimize prices each period. Firms that
don’t reoptimize, index prices to steady-state inflation Π¯, with the degree of
indexation ω. The optimal reset price is denoted P o(i).
The firm’s profit maximization problem is:
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
βtλt[Yt(i)P
o
t (i)Π¯
tω −Wt(i)Nt(i)] (4.10)
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and the price dynamics are given by:
P 1−θt = (1− λ)(P ot )1−θ + λP 1−θt−1 Π¯ω(1−θ) (4.11)
There is government consumption in this economy, so the market clearing
condition is Yt = Ct +Gt, whereas aggregate labour is obtained by aggrega-
tion: Nt =
[∫ 1
0
Nt(i)
θ−1
θ di
] θ
θ−1
The model is log-linearized around a steady-state with positive inflation.
From a notation viewpoint, variables with bar denote steady-state values,
lowercase letters denote the log of the variable, and hats denote log-deviations
from the steady-state. The risk-premium, government and Phillips Curve
shocks follow AR(1) processes, whereas the technology follows a random
walk with drift, as in the previous section.
The system becomes:
ξˆt = Et(ξˆt+1 + rˆt − pˆit+1 + qˆt) (4.12)
yˆt = c¯y cˆt + g¯ygˆt (4.13)
yˆt = nˆt (4.14)
where (4.12) is the consumption Euler equation, (4.13) is the goods
market clearing condition and (4.14) is obtained after integrating across pro-
duction functions. The effects of allowing for positive steady-state inflation
can be best seen in the following equations:
X¯
η+1
η =
1− λβΠ¯ (1−ω)θ(η+1)η
1− λβΠ¯(1−ω)(θ−1)
(
1− λ
1− λΠ¯(1−ω)(θ−1)
) η+θ
η(θ−1)
(4.15)
This gives the steady-state level of the output gap, which is equal to
one when steady-state inflation is zero (Π¯ = 1) or when the degree of price
indexation ω is 1. The equation shows there is a non-linear relationship
between the steady-state levels of inflation and output. X¯ is increasing with
trend inflation when this has low positive values, but starts to fall for larger
values.
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P¯ o
P
=
(
1− λ
1− λΠ¯(1−ω)(θ−1)
) 1
θ−1
(4.16)
Which is the relationship between inflation and the re-optimizing price:
inflation is less sensitive to changes in re-optimizing price as trend inflation
increases.
Finally, the log-linearized optimal reset price equation shows that higher
trend inflation increases the weight put by firms on future output and infla-
tion when setting new prices, and adds a term which gives some weight to
future differences between output growth and interest rates. The result is
that trend inflation makes price-setting decisions more forward-looking, as
reset prices become more responsive to current shocks.
The monetary authority follows a Taylor rule, which closes the model:
rˆ∗t = ρ1rˆ
∗
t−1 + ρ2rˆ
∗
t−2+
+ (1− ρ1 − ρ2)[φpi(pit − pi∗) + φy(yt − y∗) + φgy(gyt − gy∗) + φp(pt − p∗)]+
+ εrt
(4.17)
The central bank smooths interest according to ρ1, ρ2 two periods back
and places weights φpi, φy, φgy, φp on deviations from steady-state of inflation,
the output gap, the output growth rate and the price level. εrt is a policy
shock and the nominal interest rate is bounded by zero.
As we can deduce from the log-linearized system (4.12)-(4.17), there are
three costs for inflation in this model:
• Steady-state effects from positive trend inflation, caused by an increase
in steady-state dispersion prices across the board. This leads to in-
efficient allocations of resources across sectors and a decrease in the
steady-state level of output. The cost arises naturally from integration
of positive trend inflation in a New Keynesian DSGE model.
• An inflationary shock as well as positive trend inflation create distor-
tions in relative prices. This leads to larger marginal disutility of labour
which is costly for firms who have to compensate workers as a result.
Consequently, the variance of inflation is costlier for welfare.
• Trend inflation makes price-setting decisions more forward-looking, as
the weight put by firms on future output and inflation increases and
reset prices become more responsive to current shocks.
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The benefit of positive inflation is solely the reduced incidence of a
binding ZLB.
In Coibion, Gorodnichenko, Wieland (2012), the impact of these costs
and benefits on welfare are quantified through a welfare function derived from
a second order approximation of the household utility function. Calibration
and estimation for different levels of steady state inflation lead to interesting
results. While in the absence of the ZLB optimal inflation is zero, when both
costs and benefits of inflation are included in the simulation, a peak level
of utility is reached at 1,5% annualized inflation. This level of steady-state
inflation is enough to protect the economy from the effect of hitting the ZLB.
Reasonable variations in the calibration of parameters in the model have little
effect on the optimal rate of inflation. Furthermore, even modifications in
the characteristics of the model (e.g. Taylor pricing, including capital or
downward nominal wage rigidities) don’t significantly affect the optimal rate
of inflation, which is typically less than 2% per year. Consequently, New
Keynesian DSGE Models don’t seem to provide any basis for an increase in
the long-run inflation target of central banks, even if the Zero Lower Bound
and its effects are accounted for.
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4 A New Post-Crisis Monetary Policy?
In the first section of the paper we have used a New Keynesian DSGE
framework to verify if a higher permanent inflation target would be welfare
improving, given the extremely negative effects of a conventional monetary
policy constrained by the Zero Lower Bound. Incorporating positive steady-
state inflation into the model increases the optimal inflation rate from zero,
but the new value is in any situation below 2%. Using a policy counterfactual
applied on US data, we concluded that the Zero Lower Bound did bind and
that, had this not been the case, only a further 1% cut in nominal interest
rates would have ensured a faster recovery from the crisis.
There are however several caveats to this analysis that need to be men-
tioned. First, we have focused exclusively on conventional monetary policy
as a tool of intervention, abstracting from unconventional monetary policy
tools that may be used to fight a binding ZLB. Similarly, our focus has been
solely on monetary policy, neglecting the fact that fiscal policy is also quite
effective in tackling the effects of the ZLB, as a series of recent contributions
in the economic literature have proved. Finally, the New Keynesian models
we used only assume one benefit for positive trend inflation: lower incidence
of a binding non-negativity constraint on nominal interest rates. If in the
long run this may be accurate, higher inflation provides a number of other
benefits in the short and medium run.
We now turn to analyzing inflation targeting and, more broadly, mone-
tary policy instruments and objectives and their possible evolution after the
Great Recession. Throughout this section, we will address two questions:
”Why would we need a higher inflation target?” and ”Is targeting a level of
inflation enough to ensure proper monetary policy actions?”. As opposed
to the previous sections, we will focus on short and medium-term inflation
targets.
Even if we have chosen previously to discuss higher inflation targets as
a way to ensure that the non-negativity constraint on nominal interest rates
doesn’t bind, there are other reasons to consider this proposal. The following
points are relevant:
• Inflation may serve as an adjustment tool, whose purpose would be
the re-alignment of relative wages and prices inside a monetary union,
among the ”core” and the ”periphery”, thus avoiding the painful and
unfeasible option of internal devaluation.
• The debt burden of countries might be alleviated by accepting slightly
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higher inflation for a certain, limited amount of time. Highly problem-
atic outcomes of insolvency and default may thus be avoided.
• In some situations, the relative cost of labor compared to a basket
of consumption may be considered high by employers. Since nominal
wages are highly rigid downwardly, a way to make labor cheaper and
thus increase employment would be to raise inflation.
• The process of exiting a severe recession involves constantly robust
growth, which might lead to higher levels of inflation than generally
accepted by monetary authorities. Central Banks should not take ac-
tion to curb inflation in this situation, as this might compromise the
recovery.
Even if it started with adverse developments in the United States in
2007-2008, the Great Recession continues to negatively affect the global eco-
nomic activity through its effects on the economies of the Eurozone. It is a
generally accepted conclusion by now that these powerful headwinds are not
so much a consequence of particularly weak economic fundamentals of Euro-
pean countries, but of the inadequacy of Europe-wide economic institutions,
which tend to exacerbate any such flaw.
To illustrate this, we can think of the Eurozone as a basic two-country
model: the ”core”, 3/4 of the entire economy and the ”periphery”, 1/4 of
the entire economy. Inflation in the core and periphery will have similar
weights in the overall indicator. Assuming that wages are 20% higher in the
periphery than in the core and that we would want to adjust this difference
in the next five years, this means that we will need inflation in the core to
be 4 percentage points higher than the one in the periphery for each of those
years. A mixture of inflation in the core and deflation in the periphery may
ensure this spread, but this can be accomplished in several ways. For our
purposes, we consider two allocations of the form (inflation core, deflation
periphery), namely (4,0) which leads to Eurozone inflation of 3% and (2, -2)
which leads to Eurozone inflation of 1%.
Our simplified analysis reflects rather accurately the plight of peripheral
Eurozone countries like Spain and Portugal which have been left with a com-
petitiveness problem following monetary integration, that they now need to
rapidly correct in their search for more investment and exports. Since they
have the euro as currency, they cannot simply resort to currency devaluation,
as this is not their decision to make. The allocation (4,0) would produce the
needed convergence effect, but it would mean accepting higher, above-target
Eurozone inflation of 3%. The second allocation, (2, -2) would achieve the
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same result, while only requiring 1%, under-target Eurozone inflation. An
ultra-conservative central bank, like the ECB is considered to be, would opt
for the latter. However, demanding a 2% deflation in the periphery is very
unrealistic and very hard to accept socially. It is unrealistic because defla-
tion means reduction in nominal wages and this almost never happens, as
wages are downwardly rigid, especially in Europe where the labour market
is comparatively less flexible than in other regions. It is painful and hard to
accept socially, because instrumenting a decrease of internal demand by the
periphery, in search of trade surpluses could lead to sky-rocketing unemploy-
ment rates: 29% in Spain, 36% in Portugal and 52% in Greece, as estimated
by Artus (2012a). It’s hard to see then why this course of action would be
preferable, because demanding this sort of sacrifice from any country would
almost certainly put it on a path of prolonged recession.
Allowing for modest above-target inflation in the Eurozone, would fur-
ther generate two positive developments. First, it would allow a measure
of reduction in the debt burden of the same peripheral economies that ex-
perience low competitiveness, since they are also saddled with significant
amounts of sovereign debt, for various reasons. And second, it would act
as a disincentive to hoard cash, which is what big corporations and aﬄuent
households tend to do in times of crisis. Consequently, money that is now
simply stored could rather be directed toward profitable investment, which
would provide some much-needed additional stimulus for the economy.
Since the only thing standing in the way of adopting the less harmful
allocation is a strict adherence to the 2% inflation target, adopting a higher
target could yield obvious welfare-improving results. This is all the more
plausible since the downside of temporarily having a slightly higher inflation
target is ambiguous at best as we will further discuss.
The tradeoff in the Eurozone between slightly higher inflation and the
possibility of growth may be explained by the mandate of the European
Central Bank, which is only concerned with price stability and aims for in-
flation to be close but under 2%. But the reality of the situation illustrates
how this objective, which is generally the same for monetary authorities the
world over, may become divorced from economic welfare. An economy can
indeed experience at the same time higher inflation and subpar growth and
this argument has been put forward in support for the proposal to extend
central banks’ mandates, so that they may put an equal weight on economic
performance, measured by the level of employment. The reasoning goes
that, if such a mandate is enacted, the monetary authority will not have the
possibility to choose to hold its inflation target even when unemployment
consequences would be as dire as described above.
Most central banks, including the ECB and the Bank of England, are
32
not concerned with employment rate objectives and monitor exclusively price
stability and financial security. The Federal Reserve System of the United
States is, however, an exception to this rule, as it has a dual mandate, which
includes the maximization of employment along with price stability. In nor-
mal times, these two objectives don’t collide, because when inflation is high
and needs to be lowered through monetary tightening, employment is usually
close to full, because the economy is in a boom. But recent developments
have challenged the way the Fed understands its role and delivers on it and
have highlighted a conflict between its two objectives.
When the Zero Lower Bound binds, the monetary authority loses one of
its policy tools, the ability to lower the short-term nominal interest rate to
stimulate the economy. But it can still influence the expectations of economic
agents regarding future inflation, adopting a stance on long-term interest
rates through what is known as forward guidance. The Federal Reserve
has, very recently, made use of this tool when publishing a press release on
January 25th 2012 with the following statement3:
”To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure
that inflation, over time, is at levels consistent with the dual man-
date, the Committee decided today to keep the target range for
the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently antici-
pates that economic conditions - including low rates of resource
utilization and a subdued outlook for inflation over the medium
run - are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal
funds rate at least through late 2014.”
By promising to keep low short-term interest rates for at least another
two years, the Fed is effectively influencing expectations of long-term inter-
est rates. To the extent to which markets consider this commitment to be
credible, the language used should be stimulative, because what it hints is
that the Fed would be willing to tolerate above-target inflation for a fixed
amount of time, in order to pursue rapid economic growth, even if this means
deviating from its normal policy rule. This can also be explained as an at-
tempt to influence the inflation-adjusted interest rate, given by the standard
Fisher equation r = i− pie. Furthermore, the decision to purchase long-term
treasuries in addition to this commitment followed the same logic.
While the decision to take this commitment has been stimulative and
is indeed what most economists agree is needed when the ZLB binds, a new
problem arose when inflation approached the target level of 2%. This followed
3Federal Open Market Committee Press Release on Monetary Policy, available at:
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20120125a.htm
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a series of positive developments in the labor markets which saw unemploy-
ment fall to about 8%, better than the initial starting point, but still very
far off from event the most conservative estimates of the US full employment
rate. Faced with the prospect of overshooting the inflation target, the Fed
backtracked on its stimulative policies, effectively saying through members
of the Federal Open Market Committee that4
”Doing more at this time could create too much inflation risk,
and doing less could risk weakening an already slow expansion
and causing an unwelcome disinflation.”
This approach is all the more surprising since it was made at the same
time when the Fed was projecting that unemployment will remain a bit
above 8% throughout the year, with a growth rate of the economy estimated
at around 3%. Putting this into perspective, the Fed is thus successful in one
of its objectives, namely inflation targeting, but fails quite substantially its
second objective, the pursuit of full employment. A contrast arises between
the stated policy of the Federal Reserve and the actual policy that it follows,
which became apparent through revealed preference.
At the ZLB, the real rate of interest is just the negative rate of inflation,
so that any upper bound on inflation sets a lower bound on the real interest
rate. If this lower bound is still higher than the real interest rate needed for
market-clearing, the dual mandate becomes impossible to implement, and the
monetary authority must choose the objective it considers most important.
In the case of the Federal Reserve, the maximum monetary easing, within the
bounds of the 2% inflation target doesn’t seem to provide the stimulus that
is needed to engineer a solid and rapid recovery. Consequently, it looks like
the Fed is willing to accept prolonged weakness in the labor market rather
than allow any overshoot of the inflation target, no matter how transitory.
Adding this to a political context that allows no fiscal stimulus and assuming
that economic recovery may be based on expectations of monetary easing,
we may conclude that the choice made by the Fed amounts in effect to a
tightening of policy.
Both accounts described so far in this section seem to point to the
fact that 2% inflation targeting is still perceived by most monetary authori-
ties as their paramount objective, and that overshooting this target is never
desirable, no matter what the positive effects on the measures of economic
activity may be. After discussing the benefits of higher inflation targets, at
4Sandra Pianalto interview available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-
01/pianalto-says-she-s-comfortable-with-current-stance-of-monetary-policy.html
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least for a fixed amount of time, we now turn to the main objection put for-
ward that deters central banks from allowing any persistent deviations from
the currently accepted inflation target:
• Allowing for higher inflation would cause future inflation expectations
to become de-anchored and diverge to high, unsustainable levels. Hy-
perinflation would ensue and the cost of bringing prices down from such
high levels would be immense.
This is the argument that was made by former German central banker
Karl O. Po¨hl who famously stated that inflation is like toothpaste: very easy
to get out of the tube, almost impossible to put back in. The risk is that when
the inflation target is raised, politicians fail to control prices and this leads to
socially destructive economic consequences for savers and investors. Another
critique opposed to the possibility of raising the inflation target is along the
lines of Issing’s (2012) argument, which states that this would imply a loss of
credibility for the central bank. Why would people not expect the inflation
target to go from 4% to 6% or from 6% to 8% after it was initially changed
from 2% to 4%? In other words, how can inflation expectations be anchored
in this approach?
It is a well established belief of central monetary authorities that upside
and downside risks are not equally important and that the primary concern
should always be hitting the inflation target, because, in the end, what a cen-
tral bank can deliver is mainly price stability and nothing else. Furthermore,
there is an understandable risk-aversion for higher-than normal inflation, con-
sidering the events of the Volcker years and the major achievement of price
stability which the Great Moderation is considered to be. However, there
is little in the way of conclusive evidence to support the hypothesis that in-
flation expectations would suddenly diverge if the target would be modestly
overpassed for a limited amount of time, especially given the rather extraor-
dinary economic conditions which are noticeable in developed economies like
the US and the Eurozone.
All of the measures which are commonly used to assess inflation expecta-
tions: breakevens, the producer price index and equity data, have low values,
pointing to sinking expectations (See Annex C). But most importantly, un-
employment is still high and wage growth is inexistent; if we accept that a
diverging spiral of prices needs the wage mechanism to occur, then there is no
evidence of core inflation in the medium run, neither in the US nor the Eu-
rozone (oil price variations could generate temporary spikes in the headline
CPI, but these should be treated as transitory).
Central bankers use some version of the Taylor rule to guide their ac-
tions, putting different weights on inflation and output growth. Taylor rules
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act like automatic stabilizers, which are very useful because, once legislated,
they allow for immediate action from policy makers. In normal economic cir-
cumstances, this is fine: a fall in output is swiftly compensated by monetary
easing and an over-heating of the economy is counterbalanced by tightening.
But a different approach may be needed when output starts to rise after
having reached bottom; in this situation, an automatic trigger that would
dampen the recovery is not desirable. Better results can be achieved with
some sort of formula flexibility, maybe similar to the recent ”7/3 rule” put
forward by Evans (2011), which states that the FOMC should only raise rates
if unemployment falls below 7% or core inflation rises above 3%.
A much stronger case has to be made by economists and central banks in
support of the policy of 2% inflation targeting that is currently being rigidly
implemented. While upside risks are very plausible in normal times and
the benefits of a higher inflation target are uncertain, situations in which
downside risks are overwhelmingly predominant are more ambiguous. It
seems hard to believe that inflation expectations could become de-anchored if
slightly higher inflation would transparently be tolerated for a limited amount
of time in pursuit of full employment. Given the potentially significant ben-
efits of higher inflation for the reduction of unemployment, it may well be
that, in lack of evidence to the contrary, the welfare-maximizing level of infla-
tion could be higher in recessions and ZLB situations than in normal times.
The chief benefit of having well-anchored inflation expectations is that a lim-
ited period of above-target inflation wouldn’t disturb the long-run inflation
outlook. Central banks may find that they need to take advantage of this.
The credibility of a central bank is thus of paramount importance and
the fear of losing it is what stops monetary authorities from engineering a
more stimulative policy through temporary overshooting. But the credibility
argument can be looked at in another way. If central banks reject any over-
shooting when economic realities might justify it, they will indeed enjoy very
strong credibility, so much so that if they will ever need to create inflation
expectations in deflation times, when this is most needed, they might find
that they no longer have the ability to do so, as their commitment to future
higher inflation will not be believed by the markets.
In discussing monetary policy issues we have focused exclusively on a
single objective and a single instrument: inflation targeting through short-
term interest rate adjustment. And with good reason, since the consensus
among central bankers before the crisis was that simple inflation targeting
is the state of the art approach to monetary policy. Only when the ZLB
binds, which wasn’t expected to happen very often, would unconventional
interventions, such as quantitative easing, be acceptable. The reasoning be-
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hind this approach was that achieving stable inflation through conventional
intervention would suffice to ensure macro stability, or a stable output gap;
in other words, the evolution of these two indicators was considered to be
closely correlated. This simple, straight-forward way to understand and ap-
ply monetary policy lost its credibility after the crisis, as two weaknesses
came to attention. First, the evolutions of inflation and output gap need not
be correlated, mainly due to downward price and wage rigidities, and second,
even if inflation and output are stable, there are other factors - financial in-
stability shocks for instance - which can negatively impact the economy and
should thus be closely monitored.
In this context and taking into account that the main central banks
are beginning to implement exit strategies from the unconventional policies
they are currently undertaking, the question that is being asked is whether
a return to pre-crisis monetary policy is warranted or if monetary policy has
to be expanded to include more objectives, which could be approached with
more instruments. Given that the unique objective of price stability proved
insufficient, both in preventing the crisis and in effectively addressing its
consequences, a policy of more objectives and instruments seems beneficial,
in line with Blanchard’s (2012) proposal. While this would be a step back
from the neat pre-crisis consensus, it may well prove to be a more effective
approach to implement monetary policy in a welfare-maximizing way.
Adding several instruments and objectives to the monetary mix will
enable central banks to take account of heterogeneous economic situations,
which can’t all be effectively addressed using the single-objective, single-
instrument approach, as Artus (2012b) pointed out. In the Eurozone, for in-
stance, there are different ways in which financing is done, mainly fixed-rate
and floating-rate. In the latter approach, which is widespread in Southern
Europe, the interest paid on mortgage loans varies in relation with the bench-
mark interest rate set by the ECB. It follows that any conventional action
undertaken by the ECB will immediately affect the economies of these coun-
tries, while in countries that use fixed rates primarily, the effects are more
latent. We briefly discuss here possible objectives and instruments that may
be considered:
• The level of the short-term interest instrument can be coordinated with
both inflation and output gap. As the dynamics of these two indicators
seem to become more and more uncorrelated and especially so during
crises, central bankers must monitor the level of the output gap just
as closely as they do the evolution of inflation as opposed to assuming
that inflation stability will automatic lead to output gap stability.
• Given that both inflation and output gap indicators have been sta-
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ble before the crisis and thus did not indicate underlying problems
in the economy, monitoring financial stability through macro pruden-
tial means will provide a more complex overview for policymakers. In
other words, closely tracking macroeconomic stability should no longer
be enough for central banks, as financial stability also concerns them.
• Quite importantly, targeting inflation and output gap through the pol-
icy rate and ensuring financial stability through macro prudential con-
trol should not be two separate activities, undertaken by two separate
entities, as there are a series of correlations between them. For in-
stance, a lower interest rate encourages risk-taking behavior and may
require tighter control, whereas higher reserve requirements for banks
who provide mortgages might affect residential investment and the total
income of the economy.
• Stabilization of the exchange rate may constitute an objective for mon-
etary authorities, as the evolution of this indicator can strongly influ-
ence the economic perspectives of a country. To understand why, we
can look at balance-of-payments crisis situations, such as in Mexico
1994, South-East Asia 1997 and Argentina 1999. Once a certain value
or growth rate of the exchange rate is set as an objective, sterilized
intervention by the central bank can be the instrument used to achieve
this goal.
• Reasonable credit growth is another issue. At the same time, banks
can engage in solid loan activities which serve the productive invest-
ments of companies and in mortgage loans which lead to the unsus-
tainable growth of housing prices. Obviously, the social value of the
first types of loan is much bigger and a central bank would want to
take this into account and adjust its macro prudential policy accord-
ingly. Furthermore, while some countries may experience growth and
strong credit conditions, others may experience slow growth caused by
tight credit conditions, and these discrepancies may appear amongst
countries which belong to a monetary union.
The interplay of all these objectives and instruments and the appro-
priate values of the targets set are beyond the scope of this paper. But
after an evaluation of pre-crisis monetary policy and of monetary policy as
it is currently understood, it seems that we are heading from a one-target
one-instrument approach to a multi-target multi-instrument approach. The
challenge for future research will be to draw a much clearer picture of how
such a new monetary policy would look like.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we have looked at the issue of optimal inflation at the
Zero Lower Bound, investigating whether or not it is welfare-improving to
permanently increase central banks’ inflation targets above the current 2%
objective. Using a New Keynesian DSGE framework, first with zero steady-
state inflation and then with trend inflation, we have found no proof that
this would be desirable, as estimates for optimal inflation given by the models
are consistent with the current target. The main reason for this is that New
Keynesian DSGEs attach several costs but only one benefit to higher trend
inflation, namely reduced incidence of hitting the ZLB. As the inflation target
rises above a certain threshold, usually between 2% and 3%, costs outweigh
this single benefit. We have however shown, using a policy counterfactual on
US data, that conventional monetary policy has been restricted by the ZLB
during the current crisis and that an additional 1% wiggle room would have
been needed to ensure an optimal response by the monetary authority to the
severe negative shocks that have occurred.
Switching to an empirical analysis, we find that temporary higher infla-
tion targets have considerable benefits: alleviating debt burdens, serving as
an adjustment tool in a monetary union or reducing the real cost of labor
when unemployment is high (none of which have yet been modeled into a
DSGE framework). These benefits provide justification for temporary higher
targets or transparent overshooting of the 2% target for a limited period. Fur-
thermore, these considerations justify awarding a double mandate to mone-
tary authorities, who should pursue price stability and low unemployment.
In this context, we addressed the case of the Federal Reserve which follows a
double mandate, but whose strict adherence to 2% inflation targeting makes
it reluctant to allow a strong job-creating and mildly inflationary recovery in
the US.
Lastly, we discussed the outlook for post-crisis monetary policy. Rather
than going back to the one-target one-instrument strategy of inflation tar-
geting, a consensus seems to be forming around a more complex form of
monetary policy that should be better suited to current heterogeneous eco-
nomic realities. This would include several instruments (e.g. short-term
interest rates, unconventional interventions, macro prudential control) and
several targets (e.g. inflation, output gap, unemployment, financial stability,
exchange rate stability or credit growth).
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A Blanchard-Kahn Solution Method for the
NK DGSE Model with Positive Steady-
State Inflation
Since the state vector’s covariance matrix turns is singular because of
the presence of lagged endogenous variables in the state vector, we will use
a generalized Schur decomposition. The system becomes:
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 βγz 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 −1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 β 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 βγz
1 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0


yˆt
pˆit
rˆt
qˆt
xˆt+1
gˆt+1
λˆt+1
yˆt+1
pˆit+1
qˆt+1

=

−γz 0 0 0 0 0 (z − βγ)(z − γ) z2 + βγ2 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 −α 0 0 0 0 ψ 0 1 + βα 0
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −γz 0 0 0 0 0 z2 + βγ2
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 ρa 0 ρx ρg 0 0 ρpi 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1


yˆt−1
pˆit−1
rˆt−1
qˆt−1
xˆt
gˆt
λˆt
yˆt
pˆit
qˆt

+

−(z − βγρa)(z − γ) 0 γz 0
0 0 0 0
−ψ −1 0 0
0 0 −1 0
−βγ(z − γ)(1− ρa) 0 0 γz 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

ξt
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Furthermore, we can write as a system of linear expectational difference
equations driven by the exogenous shocks:
ξt = Pξt−1 + εt
where
P =

ρa 0 0 0
0 ρe 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

εt =
[
εat εet εzt εrt
]′
Using the complex Schur decomposition on A and B, as in Klein (2000),
we write:
QAZ = S
and
QBZ = T
where Q and Z are unitary matrices and S and T are upper triangular
matrices
QQ′ = I = ZZ ′
The generalized eigenvalues of A and B can be found as the ratios of
the diagonal elements of T and S:
λii(B,A) = tii/sii | i = 1, 2 . . . , 10
Let λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ . . . ≤ λm, m be the number of eigenvalues, n1 be the
number of eigenvalues larger than one (outside unit circle), n2 and be the
number of eigenvalues smaller than one (inside unit circle). Then:
1. If n1 = n2, then there exists a unique non-explosive solution
2. If n1 ≤ n2, then there exist an infinity of non-explosive solutions (mul-
tiple or sunspot solutions)
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3. If n1 ≥ n2, then there exist only explosive solutions (no solution)
Therefore, uniqueness requires that there are as many unstable eigen-
values as the number of control (jump) variables. Since there are four state
variables in the vector s0t , if 4 of the generalized eigenvalues lie inside the unit
circle and 6 of the generalized eigenvalues lie outside the unit circle, then the
system has a unique solution.
The matrices Q, Z, S, and T are arranged so that the absolute values
of the eigenvalues increase for lower rows of the matrices:
U =
[
Q1
Q2
]
where Q1 is (4× 10) and Q2 is (6× 10)
Z =
[
Z11 Z12
Z21 Z22
]
S =
[
S11 S12
0 S22
]
T =
[
T11 T12
0 T22
]
where Z11, S11, and T11 are (4× 4), Z12, S12, and T12 are (4× 6), Z21 is
(6× 4), and Z22, S22, and T22 are (6× 6). We define s1t = Z ′s0t .
s1t =
[
s11t
s12t
]
and
s11t = Z
′
11

yˆt−1
pˆit−1
rˆt−1
qˆt−1
+ Z ′21

xˆt
gˆt
λˆt
yˆt
pˆit
qˆt

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s12t = Z
′
12

yˆt−1
pˆit−1
rˆt−1
qˆt−1
+ Z ′22

xˆt
gˆt
λˆt
yˆt
pˆit
qˆt

Since ZZ ′ = I and Z ′ = Z−1; s0t = Zs
1
t , we can now write the initial
equation AEts
0
t+1 = Bs
0
t + Cξt as:
AZEts
1
t+1 = BZs
1
t + Cξt
and if we pre-multiply this with Q:
SEts
1
t+1 = Ts
1
t +QCξt
We write the partitioned matrix as:
S11Ets
1
1t+1 + S12Ets
1
2t+1 = T11s
1
1t + T12s
1
2t +Q1Cξt
and with explosive eigenvalues:
S22Ets
1
2t+1 = T22s
1
2t +Q2Cξt
To keep the last equation from generating an explosive path, we need:
s12t = −T−122 Rξt
Where R is a (6× 4) matrix given by:
vec(R) = vec
∞∑
j=0
(S22T
−1
22 )
jQ2CP
j = [I − P ⊗ (S22T−122 )]−1vec(Q2C)
Thus, we get finally using s12t:
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
xˆt
gˆt
λˆt
yˆt
pˆit
qˆt
 = −(Z
′
22)
−1Z ′12

yˆt−1
pˆit−1
rˆt−1
qˆt−1
− (Z ′22)−1T−122 Rξt
Z is unitary so that Z ′Z = I:[
Z ′11 Z
′
21
Z ′12 Z
′
22
] [
Z11 Z12
Z21 Z22
]
=
[
I 0
0 I
]
Z ′12Z11 + Z
′
22Z21 = 0
− (Z ′22)−1Z ′12 = Z21Z−111 = M1
such that:
M1 = Z21Z
−1
11
Furthermore,
Z ′12Z12 + Z
′
22Z22 = I
(Z22)
−1 = Z22 + (Z22)−1Z ′12Z12 = Z22 − Z21Z−111 Z12
Thus, M2 is:
M2 = −[Z22 − Z21Z−111 Z12]T−122 R
Consequently: 
xˆt
gˆt
λˆt
yˆt
pˆit
qˆt
 = M1

yˆt−1
pˆit−1
rˆt−1
qˆt−1
M2ξt
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We get a second equation using s11t:
s11t = (Z
′
11 − Z ′21Z21Z−111 )

yˆt−1
pˆit−1
rˆt−1
qˆt−1
− Z ′21[Z22 − Z21Z−111 Z12]T−122 Rξt
Using
Z ′11Z11 + Z
′
21Z21 = I
or
Z ′11 + Z
′
21Z21Z
−1
11 = Z
−1
11
and
Z ′21[Z22 − Z21Z−111 Z12] = Z ′21Z22 − Z ′21Z21Z−111 Z12 = −Z−111 Z12
s11t can be re-written as:
s11t = Z
−1
11

yˆt−1
pˆit−1
rˆt−1
qˆt−1
+ Z−111 Z12T−122 Rξt
Then; 
yˆt
pˆit
rˆt
qˆt
 = M3

yˆt−1
pˆit−1
rˆt−1
qˆt−1
+M4ξt
where
M3 = Z11S
−1
11 T11Z
−1
11
M4 = Z11S
−1
11 (T11Z
−1
11 Z12T
−1
22 R+Q1C +S12T
−1
12 RP −T12T−122 R)−Z12T−122 RP
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Finally, the model’s solution is:
st+1 = Πst +Wεt+1
and
ft = Ust
where
st =
[
yˆt−1 pˆit−1 rˆt−1 qˆt−1 aˆt eˆt zˆt εrt
]′
ft =
[
xˆt gˆt λˆt yˆt pˆit qˆt
]′
εt =
[
εat εet εzt εrt
]′
Π =
[
M3 M4
0 P
]
W =
[
0
I
]
U =
[
M1 M2
]
49
B Producing Smoothed Estimates for the Model’s
Parameters
Following Hamilton (1994) pp. 394-397, a sequence of smoothed esti-
mates, named {sˆt|T}Tt=1 is generated for the unobservable state vector, where
we define for t = 1 . . . T and j = 0, 1:
sˆt|T = E(st|dT , dT−1, . . . , d1)
sˆt|t−j = E(st|dt−j, dt−j−1, . . . , d1)
Σt|t−j = E(st − sˆt|t−j)(st − sˆt|t−j)′
ut = dt − dˆt|t−1 = C(st − sˆt|t−1)
Eutu
′
t = CΣt|t−1C
′ = Ωt
The starting values are:
sˆ1|0 = Es1 = 0(8×1)
vec(Σ1|0) = vec(Es1s′1) = [I(64×64) − A⊗ A]−1vec(BV B′)
These values are used to produce the following sequences recursively:
ut = dt − Csˆt|t−1
sˆt|t = Σt|t−1C ′(CΣt|t−1C ′)−1ut = sˆt|t−1
sˆt+1|t = Asˆt|t
Σt|t = Σt|t−1 − Σt|t−1C ′(CΣt|t−1C ′)−1CΣt|t−1
Σt+1|t = BV B′ + AΣt|tA′
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According to Hamilton (1994), we construct a sequence {Jt}T−1t=1 using the
equation:
Jt = Σt|tA′Σ−1t+1|t
and from the terminal condition which states that sˆT |T is the last ele-
ment of {sˆt|t}Tt=1, the rest of the sequence is generated recursively using the
following equation for j = 1 . . . T − 1:
sˆT−j|T = sˆT−j|T−j + JT−j(sˆT−j+1|T − sˆT−j+1|T−j)
A final caveat needs to be mentioned, concerning the case in which Σt+1|t
is not invertible, as is the case in this model. In this situation, we can replace
the inverse with the pseudo inverse, as shown by Kohn and Ansley (1983).
The equations used to generate the sequence for {Σt|T}Tt=1 are:
Jt = Σt|tA′Σ+t+1|t
ΣT−j|T = ΣT−j|T−j + JT−j(ΣT−j+1|T − ΣT−j+1|T−j)J ′T−j
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C Measures of Expected Future Inflation
These graphs show the evolution of the main stock market indexes for
Germany (DAX) and US (S&P500) in the last 5 years, as well as the evolution
on 5-Year breakevens, which are calculated by subtracting the real yield of
the inflation linked maturity curve from the yield of the closest nominal
Treasury maturity. The result of this is the implicit inflation rate for the
given maturity, in this case 5 years.
What the graphs tell us is that there is no exuberance in the equity
market in Europe or the US, as headline indexes have barely reached back
to their pre-crisis level. Furthermore, inflation expectations for the next five
years, as given by the breakevens, are hovering around 1.3% in Germany and
under 2% in the US.
There is no apparent danger of an unexpected spike in inflation, as
market expectations of this are clearly subdued.5
5Source: Bloomberg
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